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Abstract
We model the optimal reaction of a public PAYG pension system to demographic
shocks. We compare the ex-ante first best and second best solution of a Ramsey plan-
ner with full commitment to the outcome under simple third best rules that mimic
the pension systems observed in the real world. The model, in particular the pension
system, is calibrated to the German economy. The objective of the social planner
is calibrated such that the size of the German pension system was optimal under
the economic and demographic conditions of the 1960s. We find that the German
system comes relatively close to the second-best solution. Furthermore, the German
system and a constant contribution rate lead to a lower variability of lifetime utility
than does the second best policy. The recent baby-boom/baby-bust cycle leads to
welfare losses of about 5% of lifetime consumption for some cohorts. We argue that
it is crucial for these results to model correctly the labor market distortions arising
from the pension system.
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1 Introduction
All over the world, demographic transition processes are characterized by falling fertility
rates and increasing life-expectancy which leads to sharp decreases of working-age popula-
tion ratios and corresponding increases in old-age dependency ratios. This will put a strain
on public budgets, especially on existing public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems,
as is highlighted by the ongoing reform processes in many countries.
From an analytical perspective, it is useful to separate two distinct aspects of demo-
graphic change. First, the continuous increase in life expectancy will lead to a continuous
increase in the old-age dependency ratio (OADR) – the ratio of the population aged 65
and older to the working age population aged 20 to 64 – which will make current PAYG
systems unsustainable unless the retirement age is significantly increased. There is a large
literature dealing with this problem.1 A second issue are the fluctuations in the fertility
rate, notably the recent baby-boom/baby-bust cycle, which lead to significant fluctuations
in the OADR. In this paper we focus on the second aspect of demographic change, and we
therefore abstract from secular changes in longevity. The importance of the fluctuations
in fertility can be seen from Figure 1. The bulk of the variation in the OADR until 2050
comes from the change in fertility, not in mortalitiy.
The fluctuations of the OADR caused by changing fertility patterns affect different co-
horts in an unequal way, through their effects on factor prices and on the contributions and
benefits of pension systems. From an ex-ante perspective, these fluctuations are stochas-
tic, and the question arises as of how to design public pension systems such that they
contribute to an efficient sharing of the risks that arise through demographic fluctuations
(Bohn 2001). It is well known that a decentralized OLG economy cannot allocate all the
risks efficiently, since living generations cannot write contracts with generations not yet
born (Gordon and Varian 1988). Fiscal policy, in particular a public pension system, may
then have a role in making the intergenerational allocation more efficient. This is the
subject of this paper.
We address the issue of optimal pension policy in a standard overlapping generations
model with a realistic demographic structure. We compare three different types of policy:
(i) the efficient response to demographic shocks under first-best, (ii) the optimal second-
best policy, defined as the optimal Ramsey policy under commitment where the setup
is similar to Erosa and Gervais (2002) and (iii) several simple rules that give a stylized
description of pension systems currently in place in developed countries. Since the German
government has recently enacted a pension reform that explicitly reacts to changes in
demographic variables, our model is calibrated to German data, and we investigate the
efficiency aspects of the German pension system.
We place special emphasis on the distortionary effects of real-world pension systems on
1The work on the aging and social security nexus employs large scale OLG models as pioneered by
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). Examples are De Nardi, Imrohoroglu, and Sargent (1999) and Kotlikoff,
Smetters, and Walliser (2009) who use closed economy models, Storesletten (2000) who focuses on migra-
tion and Attanasio, Kitao, and Violante (2007) as well as Kru¨ger and Ludwig (2007) who take a global
perspective by analyzing the effects of aging and social security in open economy models.
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household labor supply. These distortions are often exaggerated in the literature by the
assumption that pension contributions are tied to labor income, whereas benefits are lump
sum. We model the German pension system correctly by assuming that, within a cohort,
pension benefits are proportional to life-time contributions. According to this setup, the
pension system is distortionary only to the extent that the rate of return in the pension
system is lower than the market return on financial assets, such that households would
prefer not to contribute to the public system, but are forced to do so. The distortionary
effect of the pension system is aggravated by the fact that it adds to the already existing
labor supply distortions of general income taxation. Since the marginal excess burden is
rising in the tax level, the undesirable side effects of public pensions are the more severe
the higher is the “background distortion” from the general tax system. We highlight the
importance of this form of background distortion in this paper. We also show that a
realistic calibration of the labor supply elasticity is very important.
Our paper is most closely related to Bohn (2001) who analyzes the risk sharing proper-
ties of alternative pension policies and characterizes what an efficient response would be. A
main finding is that favourable factor price movements make the members of small cohorts,
the baby bust generation, better off, even after accounting for the additional burden that
these cohorts face by having to finance the pensions of the baby boom generation. Con-
trary to conventional wisdom, an efficient response would require to even raise the benefit
levels of the baby boom generations. This is confirmed by Sanchez-Marcos and Martin
(2006) in a more realistic OLG setting. Our main result is to show that this conclusion is
reversed if we account for the distortionary nature of the tax and public pension system,
calibrated for the German economy. We find that the German pension system is right
when it reduces benefits in response to an increase in the OADR.
In our setup, the existence of a pension system reflects the preferences of a social
planner who wants to redistribute resources from future to current generations. Therefore,
our results are consistent with Kru¨ger and Ku¨bler (2006), who compare economies with
and without social security systems in the presence of aggregate technology shocks. They
find that only the early generations benefit from the introduction of a PAYG system. For
future generations, the crowding-out of private capital formation due to PAYG systems by
far outweighs the favorable effects of risk-sharing.2 For this paper, we accept the social
preferences that lead to a systematic redistribution from future to current generations.
We identify the respective weights of different cohorts in the social welfare function which
rationalize the actual size of the PAYG systems. Given those preferences, we ask how the
parameters of the pension system should be modified optimally in response to aggregate
shocks.
In a stylized two-period OLG model with stochastic production, Gottardi and Kubler
(2008) characterize the conditions for a social security system to provide an ex-ante Pareto
improvement. In their framework, the government can provide small stochastic lump sum
transfers from the young to the old, which are required to be non-negative. We differ
2Similar results have been reported for models featuring only idiosyncratic shocks by Conesa and
Krueger (1999).
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from their contribution by focusing on the distortionary aspects of pension systems, and
by searching for optimal pension systems.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the main elements of our
model. In Section 3 we discuss the properties of first best and second best allocations.
We also investigate the equivalence between a PAYG pension system and a system with
government debt. Readers who are familiar with these results may skip this section. In
Section 4 we then extend the model presented in Section 2 to a fully specified model which
can be used to analyze the quantitative questions we are interested in. Section 5 presents
our main results. Section 6 concludes.
2 The OLG Economy
2.1 Time and Risk
Time is discrete and extends from t = 0, . . . ,∞. The only source of aggregate uncertainty
is the stochastic fertility rate. To keep the analysis focussed, we abstract from all other
potential sources of aggregate risk.
A household lives for maximally I periods. Cohorts are indexed by age i = 0, . . . , I−1.
A household born in period t lives from t to t+ I− 1. The only source of idiosyncratic risk
is the risk of dying. The conditional probability to survive from age j to j + 1 is denoted
by ςj. In order to focus on fertility shocks, we assume that the ςj are constant over time.
2.2 Market Structure
Generations born in t can obviously not write insurance contracts with generations born
in t + τ , τ ≥ I. This is the fundamental form of market incompleteness in OLG models
that was pointed out by Gordon and Varian (1988). We assume additional market incom-
pleteness by focusing on an economy with only one financial asset, a claim on the physical
capital stock Kt. The spot markets for consumption, labor and capital are all assumed to
be perfectly competitive. The economy is closed.
2.3 Households
Households become economically active adults at the age of i = iA > 0. We abstract from
the utility from children’s consumption and leisure before age iA. The time between birth
and adult age plays a role in the model only insofar as changes in the labor force are known
already iA periods in advance, such that households and policies can react to shocks to
fertility before they affect the labor market. The preferences of a household born in period
t over distributions of consumption Ct,i and labor input Lt,i are then represented by the
expected life-time utility
Ut = Et
I∑
i=iA
βipiiU (Ct+i,i, Lt+i,i) . (1)
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In (1), utility is discounted by the pure time discount factor β and the probability pii of
surviving from birth to age i, which is given by pii =
∏i−1
j=0 ςj. The expectation operator in
(1) is over the shocks to fertility rates.
In each period, adult households have a labor endowment of one unit. They have an
age-specific productivity ²i, such that wt,i = ²iwt is the age-specific gross wage, where
wt is the aggregate wage per efficiency unit. We assume that at retirement age i
R, their
productivity, and therefore their labor supply, drop to zero, so ²i = Lt,i = 0 for i ≥ iR.
While working, households receive net labor income
wt,i(1− τ l − τ pt )Lt,i, (2)
where τ l and τ pt are tax rates on labor. After retirement, households receive pension income
pt,i. Furthermore, households receive a government lump-sum transfer Tt,i. All taxes and
transfers will be further specified in Section 2.6.
We assume that the only financial asset in the economy is a claim on physical capital,
which yields a stochastic gross return rt. There are no borrowing constraints, the household
can hold positive or negative positions in this asset. We allow for capital taxation at rate τ ct .
We further assume perfect annuity markets within cohorts as in Yaari (1965). We do this
because we want to analyze the role of the pension system for intergenerational risk-sharing,
not its merit in providing annuity markets, although this may be an important aspect
in reality. The annuity system insures individual households against the idiosyncratic
mortality risk and avoids unintended bequests. Then we can define the adjusted net
interest rate rnt,i as
1 + rnt,i =
1 + rt(1− τ ct )
ςi−1
(3)
Collecting these components and denoting household assets at the end of period t by
At,i, the dynamic budget constraint of the household is
At,i + Ct,i = (1 + r
n
t,i)At−1,i−1 + wt,i(1− τ l − τ pt )Lt,i + pt,i + Tt,i (4a)
At,iA−1 = 0 (4b)
At,I = 0 (4c)
with Tt,i = 0 for i ≥ iR and pt,i = 0 for i < iR. (4b) and (4c) reflect the fact that there
are neither intended nor accidental bequests in the model, so households start and finish
adult life with zero assets.
2.4 Population and Fertility
Denote by Nt,i the mass of households of age i at time t. Starting from an initial age
distribution of population in year 0, the demographic distribution evolves according to
Nt,i =
{
Nt−1,i−1ςi−1 for i > 0∑I
j=0 ft−1,jNt−1,j for i = 0
(5)
where ft,j denotes the age and time specific fertility rate. Recall that shocks to fertility
are the only source of aggregate uncertainty in the model.
5
2.5 The Production Sector
Firms are assumed to operate in a perfectly competitive market, using the constant returns
to scale production function
Yt = F (Kt−1, ZtLt) (6)
where Yt is output, Kt−1 denotes the capital stock at the beginning of period t, and Lt is
aggregate effective labor input in period t. Zt is the technology level in period t that grows
at the constant rate g, hence Zt = (1 + g)
tZ0.
Profit maximization of the representative firm implies that the aggregate wage rate, wt,
and the net rate of return to capital, rt, are given by
wt = FL(Kt−1, ZtLt) (7)
rt = FK(Kt−1, ZtLt)− δ (8)
where δ is the depreciation rate, and FK and FL denote the partial derivative of the
production function with respect K and L, respectively.
2.6 Fiscal Policy Instruments
The government can issue debt or hold assets. To stay within an incomplete-markets
framework with only one asset, we assume that government bonds yield the same stochastic
return as physical capital, so that government debt and capital are perfect substitutes for
the household. The change in end-of-period government debt Dt is driven by the difference
between the expenditures on age-specific pension payments pt,i and the returns from the
payroll tax on labor income τ pt and the capital tax τ
c
t :
Dt = (1 + rt)Dt−1 +
I∑
i=iA
(pt,i − τ pt wt,iLt,i − τ ct rtAt−1,i−1)Nt,i for all t. (9)
We describe the details of the pension system linking payments pt,i to contributions τ
p
t,i in
Sections 3.3 and 4.3.
Apart from the payroll tax, the government also imposes a labor tax at rate τ l. This
tax does not enter in (9), because the revenues are rebated as a lump sum transfer Tt,i
within the same cohort:
Tt,i = τ
lwt,iLt,i, i = i
A, . . . , iR − 1. (10)
The presence of this transfer system allows us to calibrate the degree of labor market dis-
tortions in the economy. We call the distortions arising from (9) “background distortions”.
They are a metaphor for the effects of redistribution within the general tax system, which
reflects preferences of society that we do not model explicitly. They should also capture
the effects of distortionary taxation to finance public consumption. For the purpose of
studying pension policy, we assume the government cannot change τ l.
For the household, the difference between the payroll and the labor tax is that the
payroll tax constitutes a contribution to the pension system which affects future benefits,
while the labor tax is a pure tax.
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2.7 Market Clearing and Aggregation
The aggregate resource constraint of the economy in period t is
F (Kt−1, ZtLt) = Kt − (1− δt)Kt−1 + Ct, (11a)
where
Ct =
I∑
i=0
Ct,iNt,i, Lt =
I∑
i=0
²iLt,iNt,i. (11b)
Physical capital and household assets are linked by
Kt =
I∑
i=0
At,iNt,i −Dt. (12)
3 First and Second-Best Allocations
In Sections 3.1 and 3.2 we establish some basic properties of efficient allocations. In
Section 3.3 we analyze the equivalence between different fiscal policy regimes. This is
important to motivate the choice of the policy framework that we are going to use in later
sections.
3.1 Efficient Allocations
Two concepts of Pareto efficiency have been defined in the literature on OLG economies
(Demange 2002). The first is the concept of conditional or interim Pareto optimality,
which evaluates allocations conditional on the time period of birth of an agent. Following
Bohn (2001), we consider allocations that are efficient in a stronger sense, namely in the
sense of ex-ante efficiency. Restricting ourselves to symmetric allocations3, this can be
defined as follows:
Definition 1. Let E0Ut be the time 0 expectation of the life-time discounted utility of an
agent. A feasible allocation, x, is said to be ex-ante optimal if there is no other feasible
allocation, x˜, such that E0Ut(x˜) ≥ E0Ut(x) for all t with the inequality being strict for at
least one t.
3Obviously, not all ex-ante efficient allocations solve (13), only those allocations that are symmetric
in the sense that they assign the same consumption and leisure to each born member of a generation.
From our ex-ante perspective, it is probably best to reinterpret the model of stochastic (but exogenous)
population as a model with deterministic population in the following way. Say that in each period t there
is a fixed set of households, some of which are randomly selected to be born and some of which are not.
In the latter case, households receive utility zero and are not affected by economic allocations. They do
therefore not appear in (13). Formula (13) gives a fixed weight to each born household. The concept of
Pareto-optimality is more problematic in the case of endogenous fertility, cf. Golosov et al. (2007).
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This strong notion of efficiency requires that all the insurance possibilities between gen-
erations that exist at t = 0 are exploited. As Gordon and Varian (1988) have pointed out,
a decentralized equilibrium can in general not achieve ex-ante efficiency, because insurance
contracts with generations that are not yet born cannot be written.
As in Samuelson (1968), Atkinson and Sandmo (1980) and Erosa and Gervais (2002),
an ex-ante efficient allocation maximizes the Utilitarian social welfare function
E0
∞∑
t=−I
ΩtNt,0Ut (13)
subject to the aggregate resource constraints (11) and the specifications of the exogenous
stochastic process for fertility.4 Here, Ωt is the welfare weight of generation t where Ω0 = 1.
These weights reflect the relative preferences of a social planner for present and future
generations. Different weights give different efficient allocations.
The next proposition characterizes first-best allocations:
Proposition 1. An allocation is a solution to the optimization problem (13) if and only
if it satisfies (11) and the following first order conditions:
−UL (Ct,i, Lt,i) = Zt²iFL(Kt−1, ZtLt)UC (Ct,i, Lt,i) (14a)
UC (Ct,i, Lt,i) = βEt (1 + FK(Kt, Zt+1Lt+1)− δ)UC (Ct+1,i+1, Lt+1,i+1) (14b)
UC (Ct,i, Lt,i)
UC (Ct,j, Lt,j)
=
Ωt−j
Ωt−i
βj−i, ∀i, j ∈ (0, . . . , I) (14c)
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Conditions (14a) and (14b) are the first order conditions of the household problem in
an undistorted decentralized equilibrium with perfect annuity markets. Condition (14c)
illustrates the perfect risk-sharing between cohorts. The ratio of marginal utilities from
consumption of different generations is constant. This means that the effects of a shock
(past or present) are spread equally across generations in t. In a decentralized equilibrium,
there is no mechanism to achieve this. However, a government can implement such an
allocation if it has stochastic lump sum taxes at its disposal.
3.2 The Risk-Free Economy on the Balanced Growth Path
We next concentrate on the implications of our model along the balanced growth path
of a risk-free economy, in which variables grow at constant rates. We call such a path
a deterministic steady state. Along the balanced growth path, labor input is constant,
capital and output grow at rates g+n, where n is the steady state population growth rate.
4Social welfare functions of the above type with discounting of future generations have more recently
also been adopted in dynastic models by Bernheim (1989), Caplin and Leahy (2004) and Farhi and Werning
(2006, 2008). See Stern (2006) for a critical review of the discussion regarding the ethical justifications for
discounting in an intergenerational context.
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The marginal product of capital is constant at 1 + r¯ = 1 + FK(K0(1 + g + n)
t, L0, 1) − δ
and the wage rate grows at the constant rate g.
To get balanced growth, we make the following homogeneity assumptions:
Assumption 1. The marginal utility of consumption, UC (Ct,i, Lt,i), is homogeneous of
degree −θ in Ct,i.
Assumption 2. Social weights are Ωt = ω
t > 0.
With these assumptions we can derive the following relationship to hold between the
exogenous growth rate of technology, g, the steady state interest rate, r¯, and the welfare
weights, ω:
Proposition 2. Consider the steady state of a risk-free economy that maximizes (13)
subject to (11), and denote the steady state interest rate by r¯. Then ω =
(
(1+g)θ
1+r¯
)
.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
The relationship between the government discount factor and the interest rate in Propo-
sition 2 is also referred to as the modified golden rule property (Samuelson 1968) and has
some interesting implications. First, it shows that a competitive deterministic economy
without government, and an efficient allocation that maximizes (13), have the same steady
state if and only if
ωn =
(1 + g)θ
1 + r¯d
(15)
where r¯d is the interest rate of the competitive economy and ωn is defined in the definition
that follows. This means that a government with a discount factor ωn given in Equ. (15)
is inactive in steady state; it does not interfere with the private allocation. We call such a
government “neutral”:
Definition 2. A government with a discount factor ωn satisfying (15) is called a neutral
government. A government with a discount factor ω < ωn is called an impatient govern-
ment.
An impatient government gives relatively higher weight to currently living generations
and will use its policy instruments to redistribute from future to current generations. We
do not consider the case of a “patient” government with ω > ωn. Obviously, different ω
will lead to different efficient allocations, and theory does not tell us how to choose ω. Ex-
ante efficiency only requires to keep the Ωt constant (this means they must not be changed
in reaction to shocks), and balanced growth requires the form in Assumption 2. We will
explain in Section 4.4 how we pick ω.
More generally, in an allocation maximizing (13), the interest rate is given by
r¯ =
(1 + g)θ
ω
− 1. (16)
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Changes of any parameter other than g, θ and ω have no effect on the interest rate under
first-best. For example, if we change household preferences in a way that generates higher
savings, the government sets policy instruments such that it crowds out private savings
until the condition (16) is met.
3.3 The Fiscal Policy Setup: Debt vs. Pensions
It is well known that a pension system and government debt are basically equivalent policy
instruments, at least in deterministic models or models with complete markets. Here we
derive conditions under which equivalence holds in a stochastic incomplete markets model
with distortive taxation. This means that all taxes and transfers that a household has to
pay are linearly related to the household decisions on labor supply and saving. There are
no lump sum taxes or transfers. For reasons of space, we confine ourselves to the case of
two-period lives, where households work in the first period and retire in the second. Similar
results hold with many cohorts, if the government has age-dependent taxes available.
In a stochastic setup, the pension system serves two purposes. First, it shifts resources
from future to current generations, which we assume reflects the preferences of the policy
maker. Second, it helps to spread the effects of shocks efficiently between different gen-
erations. To highlight both aspects, we distinguish between three different fiscal policy
regimes:
1. Debt policy (DP). The instruments are government debt, a labor income tax at rate
τ dt and the capital tax τ
c
t . The capital tax is state dependent, i.e., the tax rate that
applies in period t is only determined in t. Government debt follows
(1 + rt)dt−1,0Nt−1,0 − dt,0Nt,0 = τ dt wt,0Lt,0Nt,0 + τ ct rt(kt−1,0 + dt−1,0)Nt−1,0 for all t.
(17)
Here, kt,0 and dt,0 denote asset holdings in the form of capital and debt, respectively,
such that kt,0 + dt,0 = At,0. As only the young are savers in our simplified two
generations economy, we have that Kt = kt,0Nt,0 and Dt = dt,0Nt,0. We assume a
no-Ponzi condition on the government.
The household budget constraints are
kt,0 + dt,0 + Ct,0 = wt,0(1− τ dt − τ l)Lt,0 + Tt,0 (18a)
Ct+1,1 =
1 + rt+1(1− τ ct+1)
ςt,0
(kt,0 + dt,0) (18b)
and the household first order conditions are
UC (Ct,0, Lt,0) = βςt,0Et
[
1 + rt+1(1− τ ct+1)
ςt,0
UC (Ct+1,1, 0)
]
(19a)
−UL (Ct,0, Lt,0) = wt,0(1− τ dt − τ l)UC (Ct,0, Lt,0) (19b)
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2. Pension policy with a predetermined pension factor (PP1). The instruments are
pension contributions τ pt , the capital tax τ
c
t , and a pension benefit factor b˜t. The
capital tax is specified as in DP. Pension income of the old in period t + 1 is given
by
pt+1,1 = τ
p
t,0wt,0Lt,0
1 + rt+1(1− τ ct+1)
ςt,0
b˜t. (20)
It is the product of three components: the past contributions to the pension system,
τ pt,0wt,0Lt,0; the adjusted interest on contributions,
1+rt+1(1−τct+1)
ςt,0
; the pension factor,
b˜t, which is already fixed in period t (policy instruments carry a tilde if they are
predetermined, which means that the rate applied in t + 1 is already determined in
t). The government budget is balanced in every period:
b˜t−1
1 + rt(1− τ ct )
ςt−1,0
τ pt−1,0wt−1,0Lt−1,0Nt,1 = τ
p
t,0wt,0Lt,0Nt,0 + τ
c
t rtkt−1,0Nt−1,0 for all t.
(21)
The household budget constraints are
kt,0 + Ct,0 = wt,0(1− τ pt − τ l)Lt,0 + Tt,0 (22a)
Ct+1,1 =
1 + rt+1(1− τ ct+1)
ςt,0
[
kt,0 + b˜tτ
p
t wt,0Lt,0
]
(22b)
and the household first order conditions are
UC (Ct,0, Lt,0) = βςt,0Et
[
1 + rt+1(1− τ ct+1)
ςt,0
UC (Ct+1,1, 0)
]
(23a)
−UL (Ct,0, Lt,0) = wt,0
{
(1− τ pt − τ l)UC (Ct,0, Lt,0)
+ βςt,0τ
p
t b˜tEt
[
1 + rt+1(1− τ ct+1)
ςt,0
UC (Ct+1,1, 0)
]}
(23b)
3. Pension policy with state-dependent pension factor (PP2). In this case, the capital
tax to be paid in t+1 is alread fixed in t, and denoted by τ˜ ct . Now the pension factor
bt+1 is state-dependent, it is only determined in t + 1. Formulas are the same as in
(PP1), except for the timing of τ˜ ct and bt+1, and are given in Appendix A.3.
Proposition 3. The three fiscal policy regimes DP, PP1 and PP2 are equivalent in the
sense that every real allocation that can be implemented in one policy regime can also be
implemented in any of the other two regimes.
The equivalence between DP and PP1 and between DP and PP2 holds true except for
a set of allocations that has measure zero, namely when τ dt = −dt,0/(wt,0Lt,0) and dt,0 6= 0.
It is certainly true if τ dt ≥ 0 and dt,0 ≥ 0 for all t and all realizations of shocks.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
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The equivalence between DP and PP1 is quite intuitive; we just set
τ dt = τ
p
t (1− b˜t) (24a)
dt,0 = τ
p
t b˜twt,0Lt,0. (24b)
The fraction b˜t of the pension contribution is the fraction that the household will receive
with interest during retirement. It is therefore like a credit from the household to the
government, which is expressed in (24b). The fraction 1− b˜t is like a tax on labor income,
which explains (24a).
Efficiency requires that the effect of a shock be shared also by old households. In DP
and PP1, this is achieved by a state-dependent capital tax. As the equivalence between
PP1 and PP2 shows, a state-dependent pension factor bt+1 can take over the role of a
shock absorber instead of the capital income tax. Therefore, the capital income tax of
period t + 1 can already be determined in period t. To have both the pension factor and
the capital tax determined only in t+ 1 would be redundant.
The equivalence between DP and the two pension regimes can break down for certain
combinations of τ dt and dt,0. From (24) we get τ
p
t = τ
d
t + dt,0/(wt,0Lt,0). Thus it is possible
to get τ pt = 0 although dt,0 6= 0. Then (24b) is not satisfied. Although this happens only
under knife-edge conditions, namely if τ dt = −dt,0/(wt,0Lt,0) and dt,0 6= 0, it nevertheless
points to the fact that a pension system is not a natural policy regime for all kinds of
intergenerational redistributions. It is natural if there is a systematic redistribution from
future to current generations: if τ dt ≥ 0 and dt,0 ≥ 0 always, then the above problem cannot
occur.
The results of this section motivate the policy setup that we are going to investigate
quantitatively from Section 4 onward. First, we abstract from government debt. Although
debt and a pension system are not completely equivalent in a model with many cohorts
and age-independent taxes, they are still almost equivalent. If we were allowing debt and
a pension system simultaneously in the model, the result would be an optimal second-best
policy that consists of taking very large offsetting positions in the two instruments. Such
a policy is both unrealistic and hard to interpret. It is therefore better to shut down one
of the instruments.
Second, we abstract from capital taxes altogether. In fact, with our calibrations, the
optimal tax on capital income would be positive in the steady state. We find that it is
close to 10 percent. Nevertheless, in the numerical examples below, we don’t allow capital
taxes for various reasons. We have shown above that capital taxes and the pension factor
bt can both play the role of a shock absorber, in an equivalent way. The purpose of the
present paper is to show how the pension system, not the capital tax, optimally reacts
to demographic shocks. This is what seems relevant for practical policy purposes. The
tax system in many countries is designed to react to demographic developments, while the
capital tax appers to be governed by different considerations. Having both instruments
active would make it hard to interpret the results. Moreover, if we allow for capital taxes,
it is not clear where the tax revenues should go. If they enter the general budget from
which pensions are paid, this may create effects in the model that are unrealistic, since
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pensions in reality are mostly paid by payroll taxes.
Third, we focus exclusively on a Bismarck pension system, where benefits are linearly
linked to contributions, and ignore systems of the Beveridge type, where pension payments
are indepedent of past contributions. In the latter case, the full pension contribution rate
τ pt acts as a distortive tax, such that the first order condition for labor supply equals
UL (Ct,0, Lt,0) = wt,0UC (Ct,0, Lt,0) (1 − τ pt − τ l). It is obvious that such a pension system
is not equivalent to DP, PP1 or PP2, because it introduces an additional labor market
distortion. A Beveridge pension system may have a role to play if intra-generational
redistribution is important. But in a model such as ours where people of the same cohort
are all alike, a Beveridge pension system is pointless.
With no government debt, no capital taxes, but background distortions of the form
(10), the golden rule of Proposition 2 does not hold exactly.5 We will see in Section 5.1
that it holds approximately.
4 Pension Policy in a Calibrated OLG Economy
We now present a calibrated version of the model of Section 2. In particular, we describe
the institutional details of a PAYG pension system, which is the instrument by which the
government shares demographic risk between generations.
4.1 Age Limits
A model period stands in for 5 actual years. Accordingly, we set I = 20 reflecting an age
limit of 100 years and iR = 14, so that retirement starts after age 65. Adulthood in our
model starts at iA = 5, after completing 20 years. Hence, there are four periods of inactive
childhood.
4.2 The Fertility Process
The exogenous driving force in our model is the total fertility rate, ft, which shifts the
entire distribution of age-specific fertility rates:
ft,i =
f¯i∑iF
i=iA f¯i
· ft, i = iA, . . . , iF .
5In the presence of capital taxes, the modified golden rule, cf. proposition 2, continues to hold because
the inter-temporal household Euler equations do not impose a restriction on the government (Erosa and
Gervais 2002). However, in the absence of capital taxes, the modified golden rule generally breaks down
because then the first-order condition of the government with respect to capital involves an additional
term reflecting the inter-temporal household Euler equations since the interest rate is a function of capital.
Furthermore, in our model with background distortions, cf. equation (10), the modified golden rule breaks
down if τ l 6= 0. The reason is that wages entering in (10) are a function of capital which is also reflected
in the first-order condition of the government with respect to capital.
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We assume that the shape of the fertility distribution over the life cycle is determined
by the constants f¯i and is not affected by shocks. In our model, fertility is zero for
i < iA = 4, where iA denotes the age when model households become economically active
and corresponds to 20 years. Fertility equals zero also for i > iF = 10, which corresponds
to an age of 50 years.
It remains to specify a stochastic process for the total fertility rate ft. This is difficult
to do with the available data. Using German data on age-specific fertility rates from
Human Mortality Database (2008), we see that fluctuations in fertility before 1950 are
dominated by the effects of two world wars and the great depression. After the second
world war, we observe a regime of high fertility (until the late 1960s) and a regime of low
fertility afterwards, the well-known baby-boom-bust cycle. The demographics before 1950
are probably not relevant for the current situation, and history since 1950 is too short
too obtain a reliable estimate of the fertility process; confidence intervals for parameter
estimates turn out to be very large. We therefore choose a very parsimonious model, and
specify the log of the total fertility rate as an AR(1) process:6
ln(ft) = c+ ρ
f ln(ft−1) + ²
f
t , ²
f
t ∼ N
(
0, σ2f
)
. (25)
We choose parameters that have an easy interpretation and are compatible with the pa-
rameter estimates. We set ρf so that it takes 20 periods (100 years) for the process to
return halfway to its unconditional mean. This gives a ρf of 0.96590.2 = 0.993 annually,
close to the point estimate of 0.991 for the sample period 1950 − 2002 (the 95 percent
confidence interval is [0.94, 1.03]). We set the standard deviation of the fertility shock to
σf = 0.0525 per period (the point estimate for the period 1950-2002 is 0.037 annually).
This implies that the difference between a total fertility rate of 2.1, which is the replacment
fertility, and 1.4, which is roughly the mean for the years 1975-2002, equals two standard
deviations of the total fertility rate.
In our quantitative analysis we then consider two alternative scenarios for the steady
state demographics. In both cases the steady state total fertility rate is assumed to be at
a replacement level of roughly 2.1. The first scenario uses the mortality rates measured
by Human Mortality Database (2008) for the years 1956–1970. This yields an old-age
dependency ratio (OADR), defined as the ratio of the old-age population (65+) to the
working-age population (20−64), of about 27%. The second case uses estimated mortality
rates of recent years (1998− 2002) and gives an old-age dependency ratio of about 40%.7
We refer to these two scenarios as “low OADR” and “high OADR”, respectively.
6Following Lee (1974), demographers and many economists, see, e.g., Rios-Rull (2001), often choose
an AR(2) process for the number of births, not for the fertility rates. Estimates typically yield complex
roots, generating long cycles in births. This specification implies a stationary population, while our model
implies stationarity of population growth, not of the level. Notice that an AR(1) process in the fertility
rate implies a complicated dynamics of births, through the interaction of fertility and the size of fertile
cohorts.
7Since we focus on stationary populations, the OADR in our model is higher than the OADR reported
in actual German data. Both, the low and high OADR steady state of our model reflect steady states that
were not yet reached in the respective periods.
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4.3 The Pension System
Pension income, pt,i, is the product of two components, a time-specific pension factor
common to all households, which we denote by bt, and an individual pension stock, Pt,i,
which is accumulated during the working period:
pt,i = btPt,i for i ≥ iR. (26a)
The government chooses in each period the pension benefit factor bt. The rules on how the
pension stock Pt,i accumulates over the life-cycle are fixed and given by
Pt,i =

(1 + rnt,i)
(
Pt−1,i−1 +
wt,i
wt
Lt,i
)
for 0 < i < iR
Pt−1,i−1 for i ≥ iR
0 for i = 0.
(26b)
Labor supply Lt,i enters linearly into the pension formula, and it is weighted by the relative
wage wt,i/wt.
8 In other words, one “earnings point” is credited if the individual wage
earnings equal the average wage. Notice that the only difference across age is due to
exogenous labor productivity. Equ. (26b) assumes that households earn interest on their
pension points, to avoid that the pension system distorts lifetime labor supply towards
labor in old years. After retirement, interest on the pension stock does not affect decisions
any longer, it only determines the time profile of pension payments. Since households are
not borrowing constrained, what matters is the expected present value of payments, not
how it is distributed over time. We therefore assume in (26b) that the pension stock is
constant after retirement, such that pension income grows with bt. The pension stock
accumulation formula in (26b) is a more “rational” version of the the German earnings
point system, which does not allow for interest on the pension stock. It is also similar to
the Swedish system of notional defined contributions.
Of course we assume that households perfectly understand the pension rules. For the
labor supply decision, the household therefore takes into account that the pension stock
gets increased by working more and thus contributing to the pension system. The first
order condition can then be written as
−UL (Ct,i, Lt,i) = wt,i
[
(1− τ pt − τ l)UC (Ct,i, Lt,i) +
1
wt
Vt,i
]
(27)
where the value of the pension stock, Vt,i, follows the recursive equation
Vt,i =

0 for i = I + 1
btUC (Ct,i, 0) + βςiEtVt+1,i+1 for iR ≤ i ≤ I
βςi(1 + r
n
t,i)EtVt+1,i+1 for i < iR.
(28)
8In contrast to the specification in subsection 3.3, contributions to the pension stock do no longer
depend on the pension contribution rate τpt . This is important for the stability of the system, for the
following reason. If the contribution rate enters into the pension stock formula, a shock in period t forces
an increase of the contribution rate τpt , such that pension claims in future periods automatically increase.
This in turn requires an increase of future contribution rates which tends to destabilize the system if the
pension factor is not chosen optimally but follows one of the simple rules specified below.
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We can now define what we mean by “second-best” policy, namely the optimal Ramsey
policy under full commitment. The Ramsey planner takes individuals’ optimizing behavior
as given and chooses its fiscal instruments so as to maximize social welfare.
Definition 3. The second-best (Ramsey) policy chooses at time t = 0 contingent plans
for τ pt , bt, Tt,i, At,i, Lt,i, Ct,i, Pt,i, Vt,i, Nt,i, rt and wt so as to maximize (13) subject to (4),
(5), (7), (8), (10), (11), (14b), (26), (27), (28) and Kt =
∑I
i=0At,iNt,i (since now we do
not allow for government debt).
Notice that we need not impose the government budget constraint (9) because it is implied
by the household budget constraints plus aggregate feasibility. As usual, we assume that the
Ramsey planner can perfectly commit to its policy, and thereby solve the time-inconsistency
problem inherent in the Ramsey problem.
In addition to this second best policy, we also consider third best policies (simple rules)
that are supposed to be a representation, if stylized, of actual pension systems. Concretely,
we assume for bt that
bt = const · at ·
(∑I
i=iR Nt,i∑iR−1
i=iA Nt,i
)−αb
. (29)
The term in parenthesis is the old-age dependency ratio. With αb > 0, pension payments
are reduced if there are more retirees compared to the working population. As shown in
Appendix A.1, the case αb = 0.25 is a close approximation to the current legislation in
Germany, after the “Ru¨rup-reform” implemented in spring 2004.
The factor at indexes the increase in the aggregate pension factor bt to the growth of
wages. We consider two alternative indexation schemes. We take as a benchmark that
pensions are indexed to the growth of net wages, which is the practice in Germany since
1992. Net wage adjustment (NWA) implies automatic stabilization of the pension system’s
budget because increases in contribution rates simultaneously lead to decreases of benefit
levels. In the second scheme (GWA), indexation is to the growth of gross wages, as it was
done in Germany before 1992. We therefore have
at =
{
wt(1− τ l − τ pt ) NWA: net wage adjustment
wt GWA: gross wage adjustment.
(30)
An important special case in (29) is αb = 0. The pension factor bt then varies only with
net or gross wages. We refer to this rule as the constant benefit rule where contribution
rates τ pt endogenously adjust to balance the budget. Notice that this definition of a constant
benefit rule is not equivalent to what is called a defined benefit plan in the literature. The
other extreme is the constant contribution system where τ pt = τ¯
p. Here it is the pension
benefit factor bt that adjusts to balance the budget.
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4.4 Parameters of the economic Model
Household utility is of the CRRA type:
U(C, l) =
{
C1−θ(1− l)η(1−θ)/(1− θ) for θ 6= 1
lnC + η ln(1− l) for θ = 1. (31)
Since we stress the importance of labor supply distortions, a crucial parameter in the model
is the leisure share, η, which is the main determinant, and close to, the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply. There is no consensus yet on what this elasticity is in reality. The early
empirical literature on labor supply elasticities reports low values, around 0.2 (Pencavel
1987). This is due to the fact that those studies have typically focused on the hours
decision of prime age men (intensive margin), which is now known to be the most inelastic
part of labor supply. The more recent literature not only examines hours worked, but
also the participation decision, of both men and women (extensive margin). Haefke and
Reiter (2006) find that a value of 0.6 is compatible with both micro and macro evidence.
Proponents of real business cycle analysis typically use even higher values of η, around
1.5, cf., e.g., Prescott (2004). We therefore choose η = 0.6 as a benchmark, but also
report results for the cases η = 0.2 and η = 1.5. In our benchmark calibration, we set the
coefficient of relative risk aversion to θ = 1 (log utility). In the sensitivity analysis we also
consider the case θ = 2.
We use the CES production function
F (Kt, ZtLt) =

[
αK−ξt + (1− α)(ZtLt)−ξ
]−1/ξ
for ξ 6= 0
Kαt (ZtLt)
1−α for ξ = 0,
(32)
where the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is given by 1/(1 + ξ). Our
benchmark specification is the Cobb-Douglas production function, ξ = 0. We also consider
a substitution elasticity equal to 4, in which case factor prices react less in response to a
demographic shock. This is consistent with balanced growth because of labor augmenting
technological progress. Throughout, we set the production elasticity of capital such that
the capital share in gross output equals 1/3.
Our target value of the gross investment to GDP ratio is 0.235, which is the average of
1960-1990 in Germany. Since the capital output ratio slightly trends upwards during this
time period, we choose the value at the end of the period (1990) which equals 3. With
these values and under the assumption of a constant population and an annual productivity
growth of g = 0.015, we obtain a depreciation rate of δ = 0.345 over 5 years.
In the steady state that represents the German economy after 1990, we calibrate the
background distortion such that the labor tax burden equals 0.57. This is the value of
the “tax wedge” for the year 2000 in the OECD institutional database, updated by Baker
et al. (2003). This number includes all the social security contributions, so we identify
it with τ pt + τ
l in the model. Of course, the real labor supply distortion is lower than
that, because only part of the pension contributions are distortive (cf. the discussion in
17
the introduction). To match the labor tax burden of 0.57 we set background distortions to
τ l = 0.3497. For 1960, the database reports a wedge of 0.42. Our “low OADR” calibration
then targets this labor tax rate, which requires a background distortion of τ l = 0.2892.
The age-productivity profile {²i}Ii=iA is taken from Fitzenberger, Hujer, MaCurdy, and
Schnabel (2001) and generates an average life-cycle wage profile consistent with German
data. The households’ discount factor β is chosen such that, in steady state, the capital-
output ratio matches the target of 3, cf. above. The discount factor of the government,
ω, is calibrated as follows. In our scenarios in which we consider a neutral government,
cf. definition 2, we choose ω such that there is no pension system in the steady state. In
case we consider an impatient government, we choose ω such that we match the observed
size of the pension system. More precisely, the optimal pension size—measured as old-age
cash benefits to GDP—in this case matches the target of 8.7%, which we take from the
OECD’s Social Security Database as the average during the 90th. The environment for
which we do this calibration should reflect the German economy before 1970, with a labor
tax rate of 42 percent. We then obtain a private discount rate of 0.9893 annually, and
a government discount rate of 0.9774 annually. This difference implies, for example, that
the marginal utility of a currently 20 year old household counts only 54.4 percent of the
marginal utility of a currently 70 year old. This difference is big, but not implausible.
Re-calibration in experiments
We report results for a variety of parameter combinations. When we change a basic param-
eter of the model, which does not reflect a change in policy, or a change in the environment
over time, we recalibrate β, ω and α so as to match the capital output ratio, labor share
and the size of the pension system under the low OADR scenario. This is the case when we
use a CES rather than a Cobb-Douglas production function, or risk aversion θ = 2 rather
than log utility.
An exception is the labor supply elasticity. When changing η, we keep β, ω and α
unchanged, because we are interested in how the labor supply elasticity affects the optimal
size of the pension system for fixed government preferences and technology. Similarly, for
the comparison of the “low OADR” to the “high OADR” population scenario, and for
comparing different pension systems, we do not recalibrate β, ω or α.
4.5 Solution Method
We model the government problem as a Ramsey problem under full commitment. To
solve it, we adopt the recursive contracts approach of Marcet and Marimon (1998). In
this approach, the state vector is augmented by the Lagrange multipliers of the dynamic
households’ first order conditions, which carry the information about the planner’s past
commitments. In period 0, where the Ramsey planner starts the optimization without
being bound by any past commitments, the Lagrange multipliers start at the value 0.
Since there are many cohorts, our dynamic system is very large; it has about 180
18
variables, out of which about 80 are state variables.9 We can therefore only solve for a
linear approximation around the deterministic steady state. Note that the steady state is
unique because we deal with OLG households (Erosa and Gervais 2002), contrary to many
optimal fiscal policy problems with infinitely-lived households. To compute the linearized
model, we use a symbolic differentiation tool to differentiate the government’s Lagrangian
with respect to all the variables, and output the result in Matlab syntax. The linearized
system is then solved using the Sims (2001) package. There is a unique stable solution of
the linearized model.
For impulse responses and simulations, we start the system at the steady state, including
the steady state values of the Lagrange multipliers. This type of solution to the policy
problem is now often called “policy from a timeless perspective” in the literature on optimal
monetary policy (cf. for example Woodford (2003)).
5 Numerical Results
We start the presentation of the results in Section 5.1 with a comparative steady state
analysis. Our main results about the optimal response of an impatient government to fer-
tility shocks in an environment with a realistic labor supply distortion are in Section 5.3.2.
To understand these results, we first analyse the response of a neutral government in
Section 5.2, and of an impatient government under low distortions in Section 5.3.1. As a
further robustness check, the role of factor price movements is investigated in Section 5.3.3.
This discussion is in terms of impulse response functions; Sections 5.4–5.6 confirm those
conclusions looking at differences between policies in policy space, value space and in terms
of variability of lifetime utility. Finally, Section 5.7 simulates the consequences of the recent
baby-boom-bust cycle.
5.1 Steady State Analysis
In the steady state analysis, we focus on how the existence of a pension system affects
econonomic variables such as the capital stock, the interest rate etc. We also investigate
how changes in parameters or the demographic environment affect the size of the optimal
pension system, keeping government preferences (ω) fixed.
The second column of Table 1 refers to our calibration for the “low OADR” scenario
with η = 0.6, yielding a Frisch labor supply elasticity of about 0.6. If the government is
neutral and does not operate a pension system, the labor tax rate is at 28.92 percent. With
an impatient government, total pension payments are 8.72 percent of GDP, and the labor
tax rate, including social security contributions, has to rise to 42 percent. The tax wedge
however, which measures the distortionary aspect of labor taxes (cf. Appendix A.2), is only
9There are I − iA + 1 = 16 adult households in each period. As state variables, we then have in each
period 15 individual asset positions, 15 pension stocks and 20 cohort sizes. The Lagrange multipliers of
the forward-looking equations (14b) and (27), one for each adult cohort, are also state variables. Together
with the fertility rate, this makes a total of 81 state variables.
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34.42 percent, which is roughly in the middle of 28 and 42 percent. One can therefore say
that about half of the pension contributions are seen as tax, and half as an investment for
retirement income. The distortion results from the fact that an investment in the capital
market yields a return of 3.9 percent, whereas the internal rate of return of the pension
system is only 1.5 percent (it equals the productivity growth rate, since population growth
is zero in steady state).
The inter-generational redistribution through the pension system leads to a substantial
crowding out of capital so that the steady state capital stock is about 14 percent lower
than in the economy without pensions. Consequently, the annual real interest rate is 3.9
percent rather than 3.11 percent. Output is lower by 6 percent. The negative effects of this
crowding out on utility in the steady state is clearly higher than any gain from risk sharing
that we report in Section 5.6 below. Given the results of Kru¨ger and Ku¨bler (2006), this is
not surprising. However, we do not regard this finding as an argument against the pension
system. In our setup, the lower utility of future generations is just the price to pay for the
welfare gains of earlier generations.
The first and third columns of the table show results for different values of η and there-
fore different values of the labor supply elasticity . Higher η leads to a larger pension system
in steady state, for the following reason. The government tries to implement the modified
golden rule, at least approximately (cf. Section 3.3). If labor input varies elastically, a
larger reduction of capital is necessary to achieve a certain reduction in the capital-labor
ratio and therefore the interest rate. This in turn requires more intergenerational redistri-
bution.
The bottom part of the table provides information for different levels of the background
distortion. The main finding is that the optimal size of the pension system increases with
the background distortion. This is similar to the effect of higher labor supply elasticity: if
the labor supply distortion is already high, labor reacts more strongly to a further increase
of the distortion, such that again a stronger reduction in capital is necessary to implement
the golden rule.
Columns 4-6 of the table show results for the “high OADR” scenario. In this case, the
optimal size of the pension system is substantially higher: pension payments now amount
to almost 15 percent of GDP, and the labor tax rate is increased to roughly 51 percent.
To understand this result, recall from (16) that the steady state interest rate under first-
best, which the Ramsey planner tries to come close to, is determined by the parameters
g, θ, ω. With policy unchanged, having more retirees would tend to increase the capital
labor ratio and hence decrease the steady state interest rate. To offset this effect and to
restore the desired interest rate, the Ramsey planner implements a more generous pension
system which crowds out capital formation more than labor supply.
5.2 Risk-Sharing in the Undistorted Economy
In this section, we analyze the optimal policy response to a negative shock in the fertility
rate when the government is neutral (cf. Definition 2) and when there is no background
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distortion. In the deterministic steady state, tax rates are zero and the government discount
rate is calibrated such that there is no pension system. The government only becomes active
in response to shocks, to spread the effects of this shock efficiently between generations.
We consider the case where the OADR is low. The exogenous time paths of the fertility
rate and the corresponding OADR are displayed in the top panels of figure 2. The size
of the shock is one standard deviation of the fertility rate, σf = 0.0525, cf. Section 4.2.
Twenty years after the shock, the smaller cohorts enter the labor force so that the OADR
starts increasing. 65 years after the shock, when the first small cohort retires, the OADR
reaches its peak. Afterwards it reverts back to the long-run steady state level.
In Figure 3, we compare the response of three different policy regimes to this demo-
graphic shock. As we analyze deviations from a non-distorted steady state, all the policies
fluctuate around the same deterministic steady state. The three policy regimes are the
first best allocation (“first best”), the second best pension system (“optimal b”), and the
allocation without government intervention (“no gov.”). The four variables displayed in
the four different panels of the figure are the labor tax rate, the lifetime welfare gain of
each cohort, the labor tax wedge, and the real interest rate. The tax wedge is obviously
zero in the no-government and in the first best case. The welfare gain of a cohort is mea-
sured as the change in utility caused by the shock, compared to steady state utility. The
utility change is expressed as a consumption equivalent variation, that is, the necessary
percentage change of consumption to make the household indifferent. For households al-
ready alive at the time of the shock, we express the welfare change as the necessary change
in consumption for all periods after the shock has occurred.
We see in Figure 3 that the second best allocation is close to the first-best allocation.
This is so because there is no government activity in the steady state. The labor tax
fluctuates around zero, so that the distortionary aspect of the second-best solution is less
important.
The most interesting result is that the first best response is very different from the
outcome without government intervention. The welfare results depicted in Panel (b) of
Figure 3 are in line with the results of Bohn (2001): generations born after the negative
fertility shock who belong to small cohorts benefit in the economy without government,
while generations already alive loose. This is the consequence of the expected factor price
movements: young cohorts enjoy high wages while working and old cohorts face lower
interest rates which diminishes the value of their retirement savings. The first best policy
reverses this pattern of gains and losses: by increasing the pension contribution rates after
the shock, the social planner increases the lifetime welfare of the generations already alive,
and decreases the utility of the future small cohorts. This may come as a surprise: should
not the first-best insurance policy consist in spreading the burden of the demographic shock
across different generations? We would probably expect the first-best policy to level out
the welfare gains across generations, but not to reverse the pattern of gains and losses.
Figure 4 helps to explain this apparent puzzle. It shows the consumption profile of
different cohorts, measured in percentage deviations from the steady state. Each line refers
to a different cohort, starting and ending in different time periods. The top panel displays
the situation in the absence of government. About 20 years after the shock, consumption
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profiles start sloping downward, because the real interest rate is then below its steady state
value. Since a fertility shock is felt in the labor market only after 20 years, the generation
born 50 years before the shock is hardly affected by the change. For the generation born 25
years after the shock the changes in factor prices are strongly beneficial, because gains from
higher consumption today exceed losses from lower consumption in the future. Afterwards
the beneficial effect declines.
What happens in the first best solution? At a given point in time, the proportional
consumption deviation is identical for all cohorts as shown in the middle panel of Figure 4.
This is what perfect risk sharing implies for a log utility function, cf. Equ. (14c). However,
first-best consumption allocations fluctuate over time, as a consequence of the change in
the real interest rate. In particular, the fall in the interest rate about 20 years after the
shock causes a steep decline in first-best consumption. Cohorts participate in this decline
more or less depending on when they live. This illustrates that the concept of ex-ante
efficiency requires a redistribution between cohorts depending on the path of the interest
rate. This can also be seen directly from the first-order conditions of the social planner in
(14). Combining (14b) and (14c) we get
UC (Ct,i, Lt,i) = Et
[
(1 + FK(Kt, Zt+1Lt+1)− δ) Ωt−i+1
Ωt−i
UC (Ct+1,i, Lt+1,i)
]
.
5.3 Responses of the Impatient Government to Fertility Shocks
We now analyze the optimal policy of an impatient government, which runs a pension
system even in the deterministic steady state. That means, we calibrate the government’s
discount factor such as to match the actual size of the pension system. We compare two
scenarios, one with low and one with high overall distortions.
With an impatient government, the first best allocation has a different steady state
than the allocation under a second best policy. Since we compare different policy regimes
according to how they adjust to the demographic processes outside the steady state, we
want the steady state itself to be identical for all these regimes. Therefore, we now only
look at second and third best policies (simple rules). We compare four different policy
schemes: the second best pension policy (“optimal b”), and three simple rules: a pension
system with constant pension factor (“constant b”), with a constant contribution rate
(“constant τ”), and the pension system where the benefit rate varies inversely with the
OADR as in Germany since 2004 (“b adj. OADR”).
5.3.1 Environment With Low Distortions
We start the analysis by looking at an environment with very low labor supply distortions.
We set η = 0.2, which gives a labor supply of slightly above 0.2, and assume there is
no background distortion (τ l = 0), and analyze the “low OADR” scenario, reflecting the
German economy before 1975. Figure 5 displays the corresponding impulse responses to a
negative fertility shock.
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In Panel (a) of Figure 5 we observe an optimal policy response that is again consistent
with the analysis of Bohn (2001): about 20 years after the shock to fertility, when the
smaller cohorts enter the labor market, the optimal response is to increase the pension
payments, as measured by the pension factor b. With constant b, the contribution rate –
depicted in Panel (c) of the figure – has to increase, because of the increase in the OADR,
but it does not increase as much as in the second best response. Keeping the contribution
rate constant leads to a decrease in the pension factor, exactly the opposite of what is called
for according to the optimal policy. The adjustment of the pension factor as implied by
the recent German reform is somewhere in between and closer to the constant b scenario.
The two graphs in Panels (b) and (d) of Figure 5 shed some new light on this. In
the distorted economy, the persistent decrease in fertility leaves all cohorts loosing. In
relative terms, however, keeping the contribution rate constant favors future generations,
again because of favourable factor price movements. For the reasons that we discussed in
Section 5.2 (expected low interest rates in the decades ahead), the optimal policy favors
currently living generations.
5.3.2 Environment With High Distortions
Let us now turn to what we take as a realistic description of the current and future
economic environment in Germany and some other continental European countries. We
assume η = 0.6, which gives a labor supply elasticity of about 0.6, the old-age dependency
is high and the general tax system is already creating a high level of labor supply distortion,
τ l = 0.345. The exogenous time paths of the fertility rate and the OADR are displayed in
the middle panels of figure 2. Figure 6 shows the impulse responses to a negative fertility
shock in this setup. The optimal pattern of fiscal policy now differs from Figure 5 in that
the pension factor is reduced at the time when the OADR peaks, about 65 years after the
shock. Observe that the optimal policy now moves closer to the German “b adj. OADR”
rule when compared to the low-distortion environment analyzed above. Key for these
findings is the existing labor supply distortion. The optimal policy implies an increase in
labor tax rates once the small cohorts enter the labor market. The efficiency cost of the
increase in the tax wedge is higher if labor supply is more elastic, or if the background
distortion is higher. This is because the excess burden is a convex function of tax rates.
Once we get close to the maximum of the Laffer curve, increasing contribution rates further
yields very little extra revenue. Then it becomes more important to smooth tax rates.
An interesting feature of Figure 6, which is also present in Figure 5, is that the simple
adjustment rules (“constant b” and “b adj. OADR”) seem to be more “egalitarian” than
the Ramsey planner solution, in the sense that they redistribute the burden more equally
across cohorts. They cause smaller variations in lifetime utility than the Ramsey solution.
We will document and discuss this issue more systematically in Section 5.6.
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5.3.3 The Role of Relative Price Reactions
So far we have concentrated on a Cobb-Douglas production function with an implied
substitution elasticity of one, where changes in relative factor supplies trigger relatively
strong reactions of wages and interest rates. We next analyze the case of a CES production
function, calibrated with a substitution elasticity of 4 so that fertility shocks generate much
smaller fluctuations of relative factor prices. We interpret this as a kind of substitute for
modeling an open economy, where factor prices are determined to a large extent on global,
not domestic markets.10 In this setup, the fluctuations in interest rates are smaller, and
therefore there is less reason to favor current generations after a negative shock to fertility.
The results are shown in Figure 7. Now the optimal policy almost perfectly tracks the
German “b adj. OADR” rule until roughly 65 years after the shock, which is when the
OADR peaks. This underlines again the importance of interest rate movements in shaping
optimal policy. When those movements are smaller, a policy that increases the contribution
rate of small cohorts becomes less attractive.
5.4 Distance from Optimal Policy
Following up the analysis of the impulse response functions, Table 2 documents, for a
wide range of parameter combinations, how far the third-best policies are away from the
Ramsey solution. We measure distance in policy space by the root mean squared deviations
of impulse responses of the labor tax rate to different shocks, discounted by the discount
rate of the social planner:
D (P) =
√√√√ 1
1− ω
∞∑
t=0
ωt
(
IRPt − IRSecondBestt
)2
. (33)
Here, D (P) is our distance measure for the simple policy P , and IRPt is the impulse
response of P at time t to the fertility shock.
From Table 2 we observe the following patterns. The higher the labor supply distortion
is (higher η, higher τ l, high OADR),
• the better it is to use net-wage rather than gross-wage adjustment
• the better is the relative performance of the German benefit adjustment rate, al-
though the constant-benefit rule still looks better in all cases
• the better is the performance of the constant-contribution rule, although it is furthest
away from the optimal policy in all cases.
Furthermore, under the CES production function that reduces factor price fluctuations,
the German rule comes closer to the optimal policy. Finally, using a higher coefficient of
relative risk aversion of θ = 2 moves the second best policies closer to the optimal policy
in all cases.
10We do not analyze a small open economy directly, because if the interest rate is exogenous and not
consistent with the impatience of the planner, there is no steady state solution.
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5.5 The Welfare Loss From Fluctuations
So far the comparison between the Ramsey solution and the simple-rule pension systems
was done in policy space. Next we want to see whether the optimal policy brings signifi-
cant welfare gains over the simple rules. The solution technique that we use – log-linear
approximation about the deterministic steady state – allows us to obtain a correct second-
order approximation to the welfare function around the steady state.11 Notice that the
concept of the steady state of a Ramsey solution also implies that the Lagrange multipliers
(co-states) take their steady state values. This means that the Ramsey planner respects
the commitments undertaken in earlier periods.
Table 3 displays the welfare measure for a variety of model variants. More precisely,
it measures the value function of the stochastic planner’s problem at the steady state, in
deviation from the value function of the deterministic model. All numbers are expressed as
percentage equivalent variation of permanent consumption. Positive numbers mean welfare
gains, negative ones welfare losses, always compared to the deterministic steady state.
It may appear puzzling that fluctuations in fertility cause “welfare gains”, that is,
an increase in the objective function (13) compared to the deterministic steady state.12
However, this comparison is not very meaningful, because the steady state and the case
with demographic fluctuations involve different sets of people. What is relevant in the
table is the difference in the value function across policies, for a given process of fertility.
The most obvious conclusion from the table is that the welfare differences between second
and third best policies are very small. A typical difference is in the range of 0.01 percent of
consumption. Being familiar with Lucas (1987)-type calculations, this is what one would
expect given that consumption fluctuations are typically in the range of a few percent. It
also reflects the fact that all the considered policy rules are quite reasonable.
Otherwise, the comparison of policies in value space comes basically to the same conclu-
sions as the comparison in policy space. When labor market distortions increase, net wage
adjustment performs relatively better than gross wage adjustment, and the constant con-
tribution rate becomes somewhat more attractive. Still, among all the policies considered,
the constant contribution policy performs worst in terms of ex-ante efficiency.
5.6 The Variability of Lifetime Utility
So far we have evaluated outcomes by the criterion of ex-ante efficiency, which implies the
maximization of a weighted sum of ex-ante expected utilities as in (13). An alternative
concept of intergenerational risk-sharing might be to share the burden of demographic
shocks equally among cohorts. This would require to minimize the fluctuations of life-
time utility around the steady state. As a simple measure of intergenerational equity we
11This is not yet widely known, but it is shown by Debortoli and Nunes (2006), generalizing an idea of
Benigno and Woodford (2006).
12The reason is that higher fertility increases the total number of households, and at the same time
increases the utility of the typical household. Number of households and utility are therefore positively
correlated, and since the objective function is essentially the number of people multiplied with their utility,
this induces a natural convexity of the objective function w.r.t. fertility.
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therefore use the unconditional variance of lifetime utility.13 We have already seen in Sec-
tion 5.2 that ex-ante efficiency leads to a very different ranking of alternative policies than
does intergenerational equity. Efficiency requires that the intergenerational allocation of
resources responds to variations in the real interest rate. For example, if expected future
interest rates are low, it is relatively cheap to give more consumption to current genera-
tions, and then those generations should receive higher lifetime welfare. Equity requires to
give different generations the same or similar utility, irrespective of the interest rate.
The impulse responses presented in Section 5.3 suggest that the simple rules imple-
mented in reality lead to smaller variations in lifetime welfare than does the Ramsey policy,
and in this sense are more equitable. Table 4 confirms this. It presents the unconditional
variance of lifetime utility under a variety of policy rules. The policy with a constant con-
tribution rate is the one that consistently performs best under this criterion. Furthermore,
the German rule of adjusting benefits consistently reduces the variability of lifetime welfare
compared to the constant benefit rule. If combined with net-wage adjustment, it always
yields lower variability than the Ramsey policy.
We cannot decide here what the right objective function for policymakers is. But we
think it is important to become aware of the implications of those different conceptions of
optimal insurance. And we find it remarkable that real-world policy rules seem to perform
well under the criterion of intergenerational equity. This criterion provides support for the
German pension reform of 2004, and for the idea of keeping contribution rates constant,
which also plays an important role in policy debates.
5.7 A Baby-Boom-Bust Cycle
We finally investigate the implications of our model for the recent baby boom/baby bust
cycle as observed in many industrialized countries. To this end we feed into the model
the actual historical observations of German fertility rates until 1990. From then onwards,
the fertility rate evolves according to the process specified in Section 4.2, that is, we again
assume that the fertility rate is reverting back to the replacement level in the long-run. The
time path of the fertility rate in this scenario and the corresponding old-age dependency
ratio – for the high OADR steady state – are displayed in the bottom panel of figure 2.
Figure 8 shows the simulation results. The German system, which adjusts the pension
payments to the OADR, is remarkably close to the optimal policy throughout a long
period (until about 2040 when the OADR peaks). Welfare consequences of the simple
rules “contant b” and “b adj. OADR” are close to the optimal policy. Under the German
rule the utility loss compared to the steady state amounts to about 5 percent of lifetime
resources for cohorts born around 2005. This is not a catastrophic, but a sizeable loss.
Obviously, these calculations are based on long-run projections that are subject to a
high degree of uncertainty. We feel that the assumptions underlying this scenario are rather
pessimistic in a number of ways. First, we assume that the fertility rate stays very low for
13Based on Auerbach and Hassett (2002), Auerbach and Lee (2009) use a more sophisticated concept of
intergenerational equity where more weight is given to the difference in utility of adjacent generations.
26
a very long time. Second, we do not allow for immigration which could partially make up
for the lack of children. And third, we rule out the possibility that a thorough supply side
reform, with a reduction of the unemployment rate and the corresponding welfare benefits,
could be used to lower the labor supply distortion of the general tax system. The lower
the background distortion in the economy, the lower the welfare losses that arise from the
baby bust.
6 Conclusions
How should the pension system react to a drop in the fertility rate? The intuitive response
is that pension benefits should be reduced when the old-age dependency ratio is high, such
that the contribution rate of the small working cohorts need not increase by too much.
This idea was formalized in the German pension reform of 2004 and written into the law.
Bohn (2001) comes to the opposite conclusion: he finds that ex-ante efficiency requires to
raise benefit rates for the big cohorts, financed by a strong increase of contribution rates
for the small cohorts.
Our main finding is that the German system gets it basically right, and that it comes
close to a second best solution. The main reason why we differ from Bohn’s conclusion
is that we take labor supply distortions seriously. This includes the correct modeling of
the distortionary character of the pension system, the right labor supply elasticity, and
accounting for the background distortion that comes from the general tax system. With
the level of distortions that the German tax and pension system imposes on households, it
then becomes very costly to increase the contribution rates for small cohorts.
A second interesting finding is that the German system spreads the burden of fertility
shocks more equally across cohorts than does the second-best solution. This result calls
for a thorough reflection on what is the right objective of pension policy, both from a
positive and a normative viewpoint. Ex-ante efficiency implies that resources should be
redistributed between generations in response to changing interest rates. Politics might
reject this idea. A politically more attractive alternative might be to say that the pension
system should spread the costs of demographic change equally between generations, so as to
minimize the variability of lifetime utility. According to this criterion of intergenerational
equity, the German pension reform is a clear improvement, and a policy of keeping the
pension contribution rate constant would be even better.
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Figure 1: Projected changes in the OADR
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Notes: This graph shows projected time paths of the German old-age dependency ratio. These projections
are based on data from Human Mortality Database (2008). Fertility rates and migration numbers are held
constant at current, respectively average values. The assumed increase in life expectancy is in line with
the assumptions of United Nations (2007). The solid line shows procjections for constant fertility rates,
constant migration numbers and increasing life expectancy. In the projections underlying the dashed line,
mortality rates are held constant at their respective year 2005 levels.
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Figure 2: Impulse response of demography: TFR and OADR
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Notes: This graph shows the impulse response functions of the total fertility rate (left column) and the
corresponding OADR (right column) in three population scenarios: low OADR (top row), high OADR
(middle row) and baby-boom-bust cycle (bottom row).
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Figure 3: Impulse response, patient gov.: τ¯ l = 0, low OADR, η = 0.6
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Notes: This graph shows impulse response functions for a shock to the fertility rate for the patient
government where τ¯ l = 0, the OADR is low and η = 0.6. Panel a: pension contribution rate, deviations
in percentage points. Panel b: welfare gain, consumption equivalent variation. Panel c: labor tax wedge
as described in Appendix A.2. Panel d: interest rate, deviations in percentage points.
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Figure 4: Consumption
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
No government
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
−4
−2
0
2
4
x 10−3 First best
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
−5
0
5
x 10−3 Second best
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
Year
born −50
born −25
born 0
born 25
born 50
Notes: This graph shows the consumption responses for different cohorts in the case without government
(top panel), first best (middle panel) and the second best scenario of Section 5.3.1 (bottom panel).
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Figure 5: Impulse response, impatient gov.: τ¯ l = 0, low OADR, η = 0.2
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Notes: This graph shows impulse response functions for a shock to the fertility rate for the impatient
government where τ¯ l = 0, the OADR is low and η = 0.2. Panel a: pension factor, deviations in percent.
Panel b: welfare gain, consumption equivalent variation. Panel c: pension contribution rate, deviations in
percentage points. Panel d: interest rate, deviations in percentage points.
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Figure 6: Impulse response, impatient gov.: τ¯ l = 0.345, high OADR, η = 0.6
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Notes: This graph shows impulse response functions for a shock to the fertility rate for the impatient
government where τ¯ l = 0.345, the OADR is high and η = 0.6. Panel a: pension factor, deviations in
percent. Panel b: welfare gain, consumption equivalent variation. Panel c: pension contribution rate,
deviations in percentage points. Panel d: interest rate, deviations in percentage points.
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Figure 7: Impulse response, impatient gov. for CES production function: τ¯ l = 0.345, high
OADR, η = 0.6
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Notes: This graph shows impulse response functions for a shock to the fertility rate for the impatient
government using a CES production function with a substitution elasticity equal to 4 where τ¯ l = 0.345,
the OADR is high and η = 0.6. Panel a: pension factor, deviations in percent. Panel b: welfare gain,
consumption equivalent variation. Panel c: pension contribution rate, deviations in percentage points.
Panel d: interest rate, deviations in percentage points.
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Figure 8: Baby boom/bust, impatient gov.: τ¯ l = 0.345, high OADR, η = 0.6
1900 1950 2000 2050
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
b)
Cohort born in
L
ife
tim
e
 w
e
lfa
re
 g
ai
n
 
 
1950 2000 2050 2100
0.2
0.22
0.24
0.26
0.28
c)
Year
P
e
n
si
o
n
 c
o
n
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
ra
te
1950 2000 2050 2100
0.03
0.032
0.034
0.036
0.038
0.04
0.042
d)
Year
In
te
re
st
 r
a
te
1950 2000 2050 2100
−40
−30
−20
−10
0
10
20
P
e
n
si
o
n
 f
a
ct
o
r
a)
Year
optimal b
constant b
constant τ
b adj. OADR
Notes: This graph shows alternative policy reactions to the baby boom bust in Germany where τ¯ l = 0.345,
the OADR is high and η = 0.6. Panel a: pension factor. Panel b: welfare gain, consumption equivalent
variation. Panel c: pension contribution rate. Panel d: interest rate.
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Table 1: Steady state results
Low OADR, η = High OADR, η =
0.2 0.6 1.5 0.2 0.6 1.5
τ l = 0.2892
K, NoPens 24.83 17.73 10.75 26.94 19.19 11.58
∆K, WithPens -13.77 -13.70 -14.23 -23.73 -22.39 -21.36
∆Y , WithPens -5.23 -6.00 -7.77 -9.23 -9.77 -11.41
∆L, WithPens -0.65 -1.90 -4.36 -0.97 -2.71 -5.98
annual r, NoPens 2.99 3.11 3.26 2.27 2.49 2.79
annual r, WithPens 3.86 3.90 3.94 3.84 3.85 3.88
labor tax rate, NoPens 28.92 28.92 28.92 28.92 28.92 28.92
labor tax rate, WithPens 40.70 42.00 44.57 50.60 51.38 53.13
tax wedge, WithPens 33.76 34.42 35.71 38.81 39.28 40.32
PensionPaym/Cold, WithPens 53.29 59.32 71.11 78.17 81.11 87.66
PensionPaym/GDP, WithPens 7.85 8.72 10.43 14.45 14.97 16.14
τ l = 0
∆K, WithPens -13.24 -12.26 -11.09 -23.51 -21.59 -19.05
∆L, WithPens -0.16 -0.55 -1.42 -0.08 -0.47 -1.70
labor tax rate, WithPens 11.25 11.70 12.69 21.53 21.98 22.86
PensionPaym/Cold, WithPens 50.86 52.91 57.37 77.65 79.29 82.56
τ l = 0.3455
∆K, WithPens -13.96 -14.20 -15.36 -23.79 -22.67 -22.26
∆L, WithPens -0.85 -2.42 -5.52 -1.32 -3.51 -7.47
labor tax rate, WithPens 46.46 47.99 51.03 56.16 57.00 59.09
PensionPaym/Cold, WithPens 53.97 61.06 75.04 77.95 81.11 88.92
Notes: ∆K etc.: percent change, with pension system relative to a scenario without pension system.
WithPens: optimal pension system with impatient government. The cohort weights are fixed across all
experiments. NoPens: background distortions, no pension system.
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Table 2: Distance of simple rules from optimal policy (deviations of impulse responses)
Parameters const. τ p constant b b, adj. OADR
η τ l OADR NetW GrossW NetW GrossW
0.2 0.345 H 0.533 0.163 0.093 0.258 0.133
0.6 0.345 H 0.470 0.125 0.188 0.201 0.114
1.5 0.345 H 0.425 0.147 0.351 0.172 0.197
0.6 0.289 H 0.501 0.129 0.153 0.216 0.116
0.6 0.0 H 0.593 0.153 0.071 0.267 0.177
0.6 0.345 L 0.409 0.153 0.105 0.217 0.172
0.6 0.289 L 0.426 0.166 0.117 0.232 0.191
0.6 0.345 H θ = 2 0.455 0.109 0.138 0.194 0.093
0.6 0.345 H CES 0.405 0.140 0.286 0.163 0.165
Notes: CES: model with a CES production function where the elasticity of substition is equal to 4; θ = 2:
model with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 2; OADR: high or low.
Table 3: Welfare gains of fluctuations
Parameters Opt. b const. τ p constant b b, adj. OADR
η τ l OADR NetW GrossW NetW GrossW
0.2 0 H 0.667 0.631 0.664 0.666 0.659 0.665
0.6 0 H 0.880 0.849 0.877 0.874 0.874 0.878
1.5 0 H 1.193 1.167 1.189 1.169 1.189 1.185
0.6 0 H CES 0.944 0.926 0.941 0.932 0.941 0.939
0.6 0 H γ = 2 1.076 0.990 1.071 1.069 1.061 1.073
Notes: CES: model with a CES production function where the elasticity of substition is equal to 4; θ = 2:
model with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 2; OADR: high or low.
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Table 4: Variability of life time utility
Parameters Opt. b const. τ p constant b b, adj. OADR
η τ l OADR NetW GrossW NetW GrossW
0.2 0.345 H 0.082 0.019 0.052 0.091 0.037 0.058
0.6 0.345 H 0.077 0.021 0.061 0.110 0.044 0.070
1.5 0.345 H 0.085 0.026 0.082 0.164 0.059 0.103
0.6 0.289 H 0.079 0.020 0.060 0.102 0.043 0.066
0.6 0.0 H 0.092 0.019 0.062 0.089 0.043 0.057
0.6 0.345 L 0.038 0.007 0.020 0.028 0.014 0.018
0.6 0.289 L 0.037 0.006 0.018 0.025 0.013 0.016
0.6 0.345 H θ = 2 0.067 0.018 0.046 0.092 0.031 0.054
0.6 0.345 H CES 0.069 0.024 0.068 0.121 0.050 0.080
Notes: CES: model with a CES production function where the elasticity of substition is equal to 4; θ = 2:
model with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 2; OADR: high or low.
41
A Appendix
A.1 The German Pension System
The adjustment formula of the German pension system is given by14
bt = bt−1
at−1
at−2
(
αb
(
1− OADRt−1
OADRt−2
)
+ 1
)
(34)
where the indexation by factor at−1/at−2 is according to the net wage adjustment, cf.
equation (30). Let γt denote the growth rate of the OADR, hence
OADRt−1
OADRt−2
= 1 + γt. We
can therefore approximate the term in brackets in equation 34 as
αb
(
1− OADRt−1
OADRt−2
)
+ 1 = 1− αbγt
≈
(
OADRt−2
OADRt−1
)αb
.
With this approximation equation (34) can be rewritten as
bt ≈ bt−1at−1
at−2
(
OADRt−2
OADRt−1
)αb
.
Recursively substituting out terms in the above gives
bt ≈ b¯ 1
a¯
OADR · at−1 · (OADRt−1)−αb .
Changing timing then results in the approximation of the German pension adjustment
rules as given in equation (29).
A.2 Tax Wedges
Participation in the PAYG pension system is compulsory, households would normally prefer
to save in financial markets where they obtain a higher return. Pension contributions
therefore distort the labor supply decision, although the distortion is smaller than the
contribution rate because future pension payments are related to the labor supply decision,
cf. equation (41b) below. We measure the overall distortion by the difference between the
marginal utility of consumption and the marginal utility of leisure, which we call the tax
wedge τt:
τt = 1 +
UL/UC
w
(35)
To interpret (35), note that the wedge is equal to the labor tax rate τ l when this tax
is the only distortion, because then the the household first-order condition is given by
UL = −w(1− τ l)UC .
14The actual German rule features an indexation to the economic dependency ratio – the ratio of
pensioners to workers – rather than the OADR as we do here for reasons of simplification.
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A.3 Proofs
Proof of proposition 1. Form the Lagrangian
L = E0
∞∑
t=−I
Ωt
[
Nt,0
I∑
i=0
βipit,iU (Ct+i,i, Lt+i,i)
+λt
−Kt+1 + (1− δt)Kt + F
Kt, Zt iR−1∑
i=iA
²iLt,iNt,i
− I∑
i=0
Ct,iNt,i
 . (36)
We get the first order conditions
∂L
∂Ct,j
= Ωt−jNt−j,0βjpit−j,jUC (Ct,j, Lt,j)− ΩtλtNt,j = 0 (37a)
∂L
∂Lt,j
= Ωt−jNt−j,0βjpit−j,jUL (Ct,j, Lt,j) + ΩtλtFL(t)Zt²jNt,j = 0 (37b)
∂L
∂Kt+1
= −Ωtλt + Et [Ωt+1λt+1 (1− δ + FK(t+ 1))] = 0 (37c)
We show that (37) implies (14). (14a) is immediate from combining (37a) and (37b). Since
Nt−j,0pit−j,j = Nt,j, we get from (37a) that
Ωtλt = Ωt−jβjUC (Ct,j, Lt,j) , ∀j = 0, . . . , I (38)
Applying (38) twice in (37c), first choosing j = i, then choosing j = i+1, we obtain (14b).
Using (38) with varying j ∈ (0, . . . , I), we obtain (14c).
This shows that the first order conditions (14) are necessary. The sufficiency follows
from the concavity of the programming problem.
Proof of proposition 2. In the deterministic steady state we get from (14c) and (14b) that
UC (Ct−i,0, Lt−i,0)
UC (Ct,0, Lt,0)
= [β(1 + r¯)]i
UC (Ct,i, Lt,i)
UC (Ct,0, Lt,0)
= (1 + r¯)i
Ωt
Ωt−i
and Ct,0 = (1 + g)
iCt−i,0. By assumption (1) it then follows that
UC (Ct−i,0, Lt−i,0)
UC (Ct,0, Lt,0)
=
(
(1 + g)θ
)i
and therefore
Ωt
Ωt−i
=
(
(1 + g)θ
1 + r¯
)i
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and, setting i = t, we finally have that
Ωt = ω
t =
(
(1 + g)θ
1 + r¯
)t
.
Proof of Proposition 3. In PP2, the government budget constraint is
bt
1 + rt(1− τ˜ ct−1)
ςt−1,0
τ pt−1,0wt−1,0Lt−1,0Nt,1 = τ
p
t,0wt,0Lt,0Nt,0 + τ˜
c
t−1rtkt−1,0Nt−1,0 for all t.
(39)
The household budget constraints are
kt,0 + Ct,0 = wt,0(1− τ pt − τ l)Lt,0 + Tt,0 (40a)
Ct+1,1 =
1 + rt+1(1− τ˜ ct )
ςt,0
[kt,0 + bt+1τ
p
t wt,0Lt,0.] (40b)
and the household first order conditions are
UC (Ct,0, Lt,0) = βςt,0Et
[
1 + rt+1(1− τ˜ ct )
ςt,0
UC (Ct+1,1, 0)
]
(41a)
−UL (Ct,0, Lt,0) = wt,0
{
(1− τ pt − τ l)UC (Ct,0, Lt,0)
+ βςt,0τ
p
t Et
[
bt+1
1 + rt+1(1− τ˜ ct )
ςt,0
UC (Ct+1,1, 0)
]}
(41b)
Equivalence between DP and PP1: first set the state-dependent capital taxes
equal in both regimes. Then with the choices in (24), simple algebra shows that both
the household budget constraints and first order conditions are satisfied in both regimes,
for the same capital holdings. It can be easily checked that, under (24), the government
budget constraints (17) and (21) are equivalent as well. Notice that this already follows
from aggregate feasibility and the fact that HH budget constraints are satisfied in each
period.
Equivalence between PP1 and PP2 requires that the contribution rate to the
pension system, τ pt , is the same in both regimes and that the following conditions hold:
Et
[
1 + rt+1(1− τ ct+1)
ςt,0
UC (Ct+1,1, 0)
]
= Et
[
1 + rt+1(1− τ˜ ct )
ςt,0
UC (Ct+1,1, 0)
]
(42)
1 + rt+1(1− τ ct+1)
ςt,0
[kt,0 + btτ
p
t wt,0Lt,0] =
1 + rt+1(1− τ˜ ct )
ςt,0
[kt,0 + bt+1τ
p
t wt,0Lt,0] (43)
Et
[
bt
1 + rt+1(1− τ ct+1)
ςt,0
UC (Ct+1,1, 0)
]
= Et
[
bt+1
1 + rt+1(1− τ˜ ct )
ςt,0
UC (Ct+1,1, 0)
]
(44)
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First choose τ˜ ct such that (42) is satisfied. Given that, choose bt+1 for each state of the
world in t + 1 such that (43) is satisfied. Then (42) and (43) together imply (44). To
see this, multiply (43) on both sides by UC (Ct+1,1, 0) and form conditional expectations.
From (42) we see that the term involving kt,0 cancels on both sides of (43). The remainder
implies (44).
To show that the two government budget constraints (21) and (39) are equivalent
(again, this already follows from feasibility and the individual budget constraints), just
subtract (39) from (21), add 1+rt
ςt−1,0
kt−1,0 on both sides of the resulting equation and use
Nt−1,0 = Nt,1/ςt,0. Then (43) implies that this difference is zero.
The argument for the case when the equivalence breaks down was already given in the
text after Proposition 3.
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